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ABSTRACT
We revisit Western Europe's record with labor-productivity convergence, and tentatively extrapolate
its implications for the future path of Eastern Europe. The poorer Western European countries caught
up with the richer ones through both higher rates of physical capital accumulation and greater total
factor productivity gains. These (relatively) high rates of capital accumulation and TFP growth
reflect convergence along two margins. One margin (between industry) is a massive reallocation of
labor from agriculture to manufacturing and services, which have higher capital intensity and use
resources more efficiently. The other margin (within industry) reflects capital deepening and
technology catch-up at the industry level. In Eastern Europe the employment share of agriculture is
typically quite large, and agriculture is particularly unproductive. Hence, there are potential gains
from sectoral reallocation. However, quantitatively the between-industry component of the East's
income gap is quite small. Hence, the East seems to have only one real margin to exploit: the within-
industry one. Coupled with the fact that within-industry productivity gaps are enormous, this
suggests that convergence will take a long time. On the positive side, however, Eastern Europe
already has levels of human capital similar to those of Western Europe. This is good news because
human capital gaps have proved very persistent in Western Europe's experience. Hence, Eastern
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Western Europe is the quintessential convergence club. In 1950, real labor productivity
in some of its richest countries was more than three times that of some of its poorest. By
the end of the century, all Western European labor-productivity ratios were well below two.
One aspect of this decline in cross-country European inequality is, of course, the catch-
up by the Southerners: Italy ￿rst, then Spain, Greece, Portugal, and eventually Ireland
(a Southerner in spirit) all had their spurts of above-average productivity growth. Spain’s
experience is emblematic and inspiring: In less than 15 years between the late 1950s and
the early 1970s, its labor productivity relative to France’s (our benchmark for the \average"
European experience) went from roughly 65 percent to over 90 percent.
On May 1, 2004, the European Union (EU) admitted 10 new members, primarily from
Eastern Europe. To varying degrees, the Easterners’ current relative labor productivities are
similar to the relative labor productivities of the Southerners before their convergence spurts.
For example, Hungary today is almost exactly as productive relative to France as Greece was
in 1950, while Poland is roughly as productive { always relative to France { as Portugal was
then. This widely noted analogy has naturally given rise to hopes that the Easterners will
be the new Southerners, and Poland, the new Spain. Indeed, this hope is one of the very
reasons why these countries have wanted to join (and several others hope to join) the club.
Given that so many people are pinning so many hopes on the continued ability of the
European club to generate convergence among its members, this seems a useful time to re-
visit the data on the relative growth performance of European countries in the second half of
the 20th century. Our main aim is to look behind the aggregate labor productivity numbers
and present a couple of di￿erent approaches to \decompose" the overall convergence experi-
ence into more disaggregated processes. We make no claim of methodological or conceptual
innovation: Our goal is to organize all the data \under one roof" and take stock.
We organize the discussion around four views or hypotheses potentially explaining
the convergence process. The ￿rst view is grounded in the Solovian-neoclassical hypoth-
esis, according to which initially capital-poor countries have higher marginal productivity
of capital, and hence faster growth. The second hypothesis, motivated in part by endoge-
nous growth models, explains the convergence process as the result of technological catch-up.
Backward countries converge to the technological leaders mainly through a process of imi-
tation (which is presumably cheaper than innovation). The third hypothesis interprets the
convergence process as driven mainly by gains from trade from European integration, which
may have been disproportionately larger for the poor economies (as a proportion of GDP)
both because of their initially more autarchic status and because of their relatively smaller
size. The fourth and ￿nal hypothesis views the convergence process as a by-product of the
2structural transformation, which is partially a process of reallocation of resources from low-
productivity to high-productivity sectors. If initially poorer countries had a longer way to go
in this transformation, this process may itself have been a source of convergence.
With respect to the relative contributions of capital deepening and technological
change to the reduction of European inequality we ￿nd that physical capital accumulation and
total factor productivity (TFP) growth were roughly equally important. However, somewhat
surprisingly, we also ￿nd virtually no role for human capital accumulation: Di￿erences in
human capital per worker { at least, as measured by years of schooling { are both substantial
and persistent. Another somewhat surprising result is that TFP was not always initially
lower in poor countries, a fact that is hard to reconcile with catch-up theories of technological
di￿usion.
As an explanation for regional convergence the trade view runs into some problems.
For example, countries with a comparative disadvantage (or no advantage) in agriculture
invariably show larger shares of agriculture, while countries with a comparative advantage
in agriculture tend to show systematically lower shares. The structural-transformation ap-
proach fares better. For example, we ￿nd that Southerners converged to the rest mainly
through a faster rate of reallocation of the labor force from low-productivity agriculture
into high-productivity manufacturing and services. However, in other cases within-industry
productivity catch-up was also quite important.
When we turn our attention to 13 (mostly) Eastern European countries that have
either recently joined the EU, or are in line to join, we tend to ￿nd very large labor produc-
tivity gaps vis-￿ a-vis Western Europe. In accounting for these gaps, we ￿nd substantial roles
for physical capital and TFP gaps, but no role whatsoever for human capital gaps. This is
in a sense good news for the Easterners, because the Western European experience suggests
that human capital gaps are the hardest to bridge.
Like Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece 50 years ago, the new and forthcoming EU
members exhibit substantially larger shares of workers employed in agriculture, which tends
to be the least productive sector. Manufacturing and services are also less productive in the
East than in Western Europe, though the gaps are not as large as in agriculture. There
is, therefore, some scope for large productivity gains through both labor reallocation out of
agriculture and within-industry catch-up. However, quantitatively, in Eastern Europe the
distribution of employment among sectors is much less important as a source of income gaps
vis-￿ a-vis the rest of Europe than it was in Southern Europe in 1960. Hence, in a way, the
Easterners have only one margin to exploit in their quest for convergence { the within-industry
productivity gap. In contrast, the South was also able to exploit the between-industry margin.
There are, of course, several other authors who have looked at Western European con-
3vergence from various angles. These include Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Quah (1996),
and Boldrin and Canova (2001). There are also several excellent studies of individual coun-
tries’ convergence experiences, such as Honohan and Walsh (2002) and Oltheten, Pinteris,
and Sougiannis (2003). Finally, the idea of using the experience of other countries/regions to
speculate on the convergence prospects of Eastern Europe is also not new: see, among others,
Fisher, Sahay, and Vegh (1998a, 1998b) and Boldrin and Canova (2003). Our contribution,
however, looks at the data from a di￿erent perspective and is thus complementary to the
existing ones.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the
European experience with labor-productivity convergence in the second half of the 20th
century. In Section 3, we discuss various possible views one can advance to explain the
convergence process. In Sections 4 and 5, we take a look at more disaggregated data to try
to shed light on the explanatory power of the various approaches. In Section 6, we introduce
the Easterners, and compare their characteristics with those of the Southerners before their
catch-up. We summarize and conclude in Section 7.
2 European Convergence 1950-2000
The point of this section is to refresh our memories on the basic fact of European
convergence. This is done in Figure 2.1, where we plot, for each of 14 Western European
countries, per worker GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) relative to France. We choose
France as a benchmark because its growth experience between 1950 and 2000 is virtually
identical to that of the average European country. In fact, the ratio of per-worker GDP
(in PPP) of France relative to the European (population-weighted) average is practically
1 throughout the whole period. The 14 countries are the other members of the European
Union (pre-May 1), less Luxembourg plus Norway.1 The data for Figure 2.1 come directly
from the Penn World Table, Version 6.1 (PWT) and measure GDP per worker [via the
variable GDPWOK. See Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)].2
In order to highlight the convergence outcomes we draw horizontal lines in each graph
through 0.9 and 1.1. Note that 13 of the 14 countries start out outside this range, and 10
out of 14 end up inside (or right at the threshold). Furthermore, in three of the four cases in
which relative GDP is still outside our \convergence band," the distance from the band has
nevertheless declined considerably. The overall reduction in inequality is dramatic. To cap it
1Hence, other than city-states, we are missing only Iceland and Switzerland, for which there were too many
gaps in some of the data we use later in the paper.
2For Germany we actually use the series on Western Germany from Version 5.6 of PWT up to 1990 and
the series on Germany from Version 6.1 thereafter.
4all, the only case in which the absolute distance from France has increased rather than fallen
is not so much a case of failed convergence but one of, so to speak, \excessive convergence":
Ireland started out poor, converged from below, and then forgot to stop { ending up the most
productive in Europe. It is now well above the upper bound of the convergence band.
The geographical patterns are also well known but nonetheless striking. Note that
the country graphs are arranged in increasing order of latitude (using the countries’ capitals
as the reference points). The Southerners (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Austria) all
start out poorer and experience various degrees of catching up. Spain, Italy, and Austria fully
make it; Greece has virtually made it by 1975, but then slips and loses some (but by no means
all) of the gains between 1975 and 1995; Portugal’s progress is slower, but it seems on track
to reach the lower edge of the band in the not-too-distant future. Then there are most of
the \Northerners" (Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and
Norway), which start out richer than France and converge \from above" to within 90 percent
and 110 percent of France’s labor productivity -- with the minor exception of Belgium, which
ends up slightly above the upper boundary. Germany is the geographical and economic \in-
betweener," starting and ending within the 90 to 110 band. The only two serious deviations
from the geographical-economic pattern are Finland, which converges from below instead
of from above like the other high-latitude countries; and Ireland, which is exceptional both
because it converges from below instead of from above, and because { as we have already
seen { it fails to stop after converging.
Of course, convergence from above by the Northerners really means that France has
caught up with them. Hence, what Figure 2.1 truly tells us is that there has been a generalized
catching up from South to North or that the growth rate has been, on average, decreasing
with latitude fairly smoothly.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the rest of this paper explores a couple of ways of
peering into the black box of the convergence processes depicted in Figure 2.1 in the hope of
shedding some light on some of its mechanics.
Before proceeding, we quickly dispose of a secondary issue having to do with entering
into formal membership in the EU. Figure 2.2 is identical to Figure 2.1, except that it
adds a vertical line for the date at which each country joined the European Community.
Visual inspection suggests that it is extremely hard to argue for an important role for formal
EC (later, EU) membership per se in facilitating convergence. Italy, Spain, Greece, and
Austria all had their convergence spurts before formally joining European institutions, and
the Northerners lost ground whether or not they were in the EC/EU. One can squint at the
behavior of the relative income series around the dates of accession, but no systematic \kink"
up or down seems to be associated with that date. What seems to matter for convergence is
5not so much entry into formal membership in European institutions, but rather { if anything
{ participation in a generalized trend towards greater economic integration at the European
level. This integration would probably have occurred with or without the EC.3
3 Four Ways to Converge
Depending on one’s background and tastes, there are at least four possible reactions
to the graphs in Figure 2.1 and to the convergence processes they describe. In this section
we brie￿y outline these four possible responses, and in the rest of the paper we query the
available data for the corresponding supporting evidence. We stress at the outset that the
four views are not mutually exclusive.
1) Solovian convergence. If you are steeped in neoclassical growth theory [Ramsey
(1928), Solow (1956), and subsequent developments] you will be strongly tempted to interpret
Figure 2.1 in terms of capital deepening. The idea, of course, is that initially capital-poor
countries have higher marginal productivities of capital. This leads them to grow faster than
initially capital-rich countries. This argument still works if you take a broader view of capital,
to include human capital [Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)]. It is also independent of whether
one thinks the capital is generated by domestic savings or ￿ows in from abroad { though that
may a￿ect the speed of convergence [Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995)]. This Solovian
interpretation of convergence processes motivates much of the growth-regression literature of
the 1990s [Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and all the rest]. It also ￿nds strong
support in growth accounting exercises for East-Asian miracle economies [Young (1995)].
2) Technological catch-up. If instead you have been captivated by so-called \endogenous-
growth" models [Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992)],
you may tend to read in the graphs of Figure 2.1 the e￿ects of technological catch-up by
initially backward countries. In particular, you will have in mind models where imitation
is less costly than innovation, so that countries initially behind the world technology fron-
tier experience faster improvements in technology than the leaders [for example, Nelson and
Phelps (1966), Krugman (1979), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Howitt (2000)]. Empirical
work on cross-country TFP growth is generally motivated by this view [for example, Coe
and Helpman (1995), Coe, Helpman, and Ho￿maister (1997)]. Evidence that cross-country
income di￿erences are largely due to di￿erences in TFP is also consistent with this view [for
example, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999)].
3Some authors use growth regression techniques to estimate the coe￿cient of an \EC-dummy." Results are
mixed. Even if it were more strongly in favor of a positive EC-e￿ect, however, this type of evidence does not
bear directly on the issue of the sources of convergence. A positive coe￿cient on the EC-membership dummy
means that EC members grow faster than non-EC members, not that they should converge to one another.
63) Gains from trade. If you are a trade theorist your instinct may be to interpret the
graphs in terms of gains from trade. In particular, suppose (realistically) that initially the
richer European countries were more integrated among themselves and with the rest of the
world than the poorer ones. Suppose further (and also realistically) that over the second half
of the century the poorer countries gradually became more integrated with the rest. Then
not only should they have experienced gains from trade but also { due to their initially more
autarchic status { their gains from trade should have been larger as a proportion of GDP than
those of the richer economies: Hence, the convergence. The fact that poorer countries have
tended to be smaller is another reason to expect disproportionate gains by these countries
and ultimately convergence.
It is customary to object to trade-based interpretations of rapid growth that the theory
predicts higher income levels, not higher growth rates. But looking again at Figure 2.1, one
cannot reject outright the hypothesis that convergence was the result of one-o￿, discrete
jumps in income levels. Consider again the fewer than 15 years it took Spain to recover
from a 25-percent productivity handicap, or the 10 years or so it took Greece to bridge an
even larger gap. Furthermore, it is actually possible { exploiting the idea of a \ladder of
comparative advantage" { to turn the static gains-from-trade theory into a dynamic one
[Jones (1974), Findlay (1973), Kruger (1977), and Ventura (1997)].4
4) Structural transformation. If you are an old-fashioned macro-development econo-
mist, you are used to thinking about the growth process as inextricably linked with structural
transformation: vast reallocation of resources from one industry to another. The early clas-
sics include Clark (1940), Nurske (1953), and Lewis (1954), among others. There is more
systematic recent work by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and Koren and Tenreyro (2004). If
resources are reallocated from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors, this structural
transformation is itself a source of growth. If Southern countries { as is likely { underwent
a more radical structural transformation than Northern countries during the 1950 to 2000
period, then this is also a source of convergence.
This reasoning is best illustrated by recent work on another South-to-North conver-
gence, that of the southern United States to the rest of the United States over the 20th
century [Caselli and Coleman (2001)]. At the beginning of the century, the South was over-
whelmingly agricultural, while the rest of the United States was predominantly specialized in
manufacturing and services. Since agriculture had much lower output per worker, the South
4Not all trade theorists will look at Figure 2.1 with comparative advantage in mind. Readers of Helpman
and Krugman (1989) may view increased integration as allowing for increasing returns in the presence of
intra-industry trade. We do not attempt to assess this view in the present draft (except for a brief remark
in footnote 16), but perhaps in the future we can explore this by seeing whether there have been particular
gains in labor productivity in sectors experiencing the biggest increases in trade.
7also had much lower aggregate labor productivity. Over the decades, the U.S.-wide cost of
migrating from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural ones declined sharply, mainly as
a result of improved access to schooling for rural children. In turn, the lower cost of migration
to the more productive sectors led to overall aggregate productivity gains. However, these
productivity gains were disproportionately concentrated in the South, which had the largest
share of workers initially trapped in agriculture. Perhaps the Southern Europeans also had
their labor force initially disproportionately concentrated in low-productivity industries?
We should stress that the mapping between the accounting exercise that follows and
the four convergence hypotheses we study is not perfect. The accounting analysis is aimed at
providing guidance as to the main forces behind convergence, and hence the results should
be taken as suggestive indications rather than as conclusive verdicts.
4 Solovian Convergence and Technological Catch-Up
In this section we tackle the ￿rst two of the possible views of convergence we listed in the
previous section: the capital deepening explanation associated with the Solow and other
neoclassical models of growth, and the technology-di￿usion explanation, which would be
emphasized by endogenous growth theories.
Our approach will be to decompose the convergence series plotted in Figure 2.1 into
three components: convergence in physical capital, convergence in human capital, and conver-
gence in Total Factor Productivity. The sum of the ￿rst two may be seen as the contribution
of Solovian convergence, while the third may capture the contribution of technology catch-
up. Plainly, this approach is a hybrid of growth accounting, which decomposes growth rates
into capital growth and TFP growth, and development accounting, which decomposes cross-
country di￿erences in income levels into capital and TFP. Here, since we decompose relative
growth rates, we have both the time and the cross-country dimension. Hence, we may term
the exercise we perform convergence accounting.
More speci￿cally, we will use the following familiar-looking expression:
￿logyR
it = ￿￿logkR
it + (1 ￿ ￿)￿loghR
it + ￿logAR
it; (1)
where ￿ is the capital share in output, and ￿ is a ￿rst-di￿erence operator. The only slightly
unusual aspect is that output, inputs, and total factor productivity are measured relative to
those of France. Hence, yR
it is aggregate labor productivity in country i relative to aggregate
labor productivity in France, kR
it and hR
it are relative physical and human capital, and AR
it is
relative TFP.5
5Of course, equation (1) can be interpreted as an approximation for the growth rate of relative labor




it are of course the data we plotted in Figure 2.1. For kR
it and hR
it we need
to construct time series for each country’s physical and human capital stocks. We construct
physical capital stocks from the Penn World Tables (PWT) series on real investment. Invest-
ment data start in 1950. To initialize the capital stock we assume that the growth rate of
investment up to 1950 has been the same as the observed growth rate of investment between
1950 and 1955.6 In order to minimize the bias arising from this arbitrary choice of initial
value of the capital stock we begin our convergence decomposition in 1960. Little is lost
by this curtailing of the time series as most of the important convergence spurts (with the
exception of Italy) begin right around, or after, this date.
To construct data on hR
it we mostly use the De La Fuente and Domenech (2002) data
set on average years of schooling in the OECD. However, De La Fuente and Domenech data
stop in 1990 or 1995, depending on the country. To extend the series to 2000 we use the growth
rates (over the relevant periods) of the corresponding series in the Barro and Lee (2001)
data set { in combination with the latest level reported by De La Fuente and Domenech.7
With these data at hand, we follow the development-accounting literature and estimate each
country’s human capital as hit = exp(￿sit), where sit is the average years of schooling in
the labor force, and ￿ is the Mincerian rate of return to one extra year of schooling. We set
￿ = 0:10, which re￿ects a broad consensus on the average returns to schooling around the
world. Finally, following yet again the development-accounting literature, we set ￿ = 0:33:
We report later on how results change when using country-speci￿c capital shares.8
Before proceeding to the formal results, we spend a minute looking at the time series
in Figure 4.1, where we plot the time paths of kR, hR, and AR for all countries. For phys-
ical capital we see patterns of convergence that broadly resemble those in Figure 2.1: Poor
countries started out with lower physical capital levels than France and accumulated faster
over time, while rich countries started out with more capital and accumulated more slowly
than France. This is very Solovian. The only exceptions are Italy, which by 1960 already had
a level of capital intensity very close to France’s (and kept it that way thereafter), and the
6Hence, K1950 = I1950=(g + ￿), where g is the investment growth rate between 1950 and 1955, and ￿ is the
depreciation rate: Young (1995) follows a similar approach. Following the development-accounting literature
we set ￿ = 0:06:
7An alternative would have been to use Barro and Lee throughout, but the De La Fuente and Domenench
data are supposed to constitute an improvement over Barro and Lee for this set of countries. In the Appendix
we compare the average years of schooling variable from the two data sets (Figure A.1). It does appear that
the Barro and Lee numbers contain some surprising jumps in their series. The country rankings of attainment
are also more consistent with our priors. In footnote 10 we report on the results of the convergence-accounting
exercise when using the Barro and Lee data.
8For a survey of development-accounting methods see Caselli (2003). We will not bore the reader with the
obvious list of caveats and disclaimers about the very rough and tentative nature of the exercise just described.
9U.K., which in 1960 had lower capital intensity than France { despite being richer. Relative
human capital in 1960 was also generally lower in poor countries and higher { or about the
same as in France { in rich countries. However, unlike what we see for physical capital,
relative human capital levels are extremely persistent, so that relatively human-capital-poor
countries remain that way throughout the period. This is not very \augmented-Solovian" at
all, and it implies that human capital accumulation cannot have contributed much to aggre-
gate convergence. Two exceptions are perhaps Denmark and Norway, which have lost some
of their human-capital advantage relative to the rest.
Initial relative TFP levels were lower in Greece, Portugal, and Austria, but rose
after 1960, so technology catch-up contributed to these countries’ convergence. In Spain and
Italy, however, TFP was already at the same level as in France, or higher, in 1960. Still,
after that date these two countries continued to outpace France in e￿ciency gains, so that
technological change did contribute to their overall convergence. Basically, these countries
used faster technological change (and Spain also faster capital deepening) to bridge the gap
caused by their persistently lower human capital. For the initially rich countries, the expected
pattern of initially higher and subsequently falling relative TFP is observed in the U.K., the
Netherlands, and Sweden. However, Denmark’s TFP is roughly at France’s level throughout
the period, so that its relative loss is entirely due to slower rates of physical and human
capital accumulation. Norway actually starts out with lower TFP and converges to France
from below, so that France’s convergence to Norway occurs despite technological catch-up
from Norway to France. One objection to the use of years of schooling as a measure of
human capital is, of course, that it does not take into account the di￿erences in the quality of
education across countries. Caselli (2003) performs a development accounting exercise using
quality-adjusted measures of human capital based on international tests and schooling inputs
(pupil/teacher ratios and education spending) and ￿nds that these di￿erences are relatively
immaterial. While level comparisons might be di￿erent from growth comparisons, Caselli’s
￿ndings are somewhat reassuring.
The casual observations described before are made more precise in Table 4.1, which
reports the formal results of the decomposition in equation (1). The ￿rst panel shows changes
over the entire 1960 to 2000 period. Formally, this means that the ￿ operator in equation
(1) represents the 40-year di￿erence. The ￿rst column reports the value of ￿logyR
it for each
country. This is basically the same information already reported in Figure 2.1. Hence, for
example, Greece’s productivity relative to that of France increased by almost one-fourth,
or roughly equivalently; over these 40 years Greece’s average annual growth rate exceeded
France’s by little more than one-half percentage point. The biggest gain, of course, was posted
by Ireland, whose productivity grew by 60 percentage points more than France’s, followed
10by Portugal. Italy’s gain looks slightly more modest than those of the other Southerners
because most of its convergence spurt took place in the 1950s. The biggest comparative
losses were experienced by Sweden and the Netherlands, against which France gained about
30 percentage points of relative income.
The remaining three columns show how relative physical and human capital accumu-
lation and TFP growth contributed to these changes in relative income. These numbers are
illustrated in Figure 4.2, where the bars show the contribution of the three terms. (The sum
of the bars corresponds to the total convergence to France.) The clearest indication to emerge
from the table (as from the ￿gure) is that in nearly all cases { despite substantial di￿erences
in levels, and aside from the already-noted two exceptions { convergence in human capital
played a nearly insigni￿cant role in driving aggregate productivity convergence.
This leaves it to physical capital and total factor productivity to share the role of
proximate sources of convergence. Broadly speaking, in most cases relative TFP growth
appears to have contributed slightly more to convergence than capital deepening, but the
orders of magnitude of the two contributions are similar.9 In view of the noisy nature of the
data, it seems warranted to conclude that { as a general rule { Western European conver-
gence is attributable in roughly equal parts to faster capital accumulation and technological
improvement by the poorer countries. The only clear exceptions are Italy and Ireland, both
of which converged overwhelmingly through relative e￿ciency gains, and Denmark, whose
slowdown relative to France we have already noted to be entirely due to slower human and
physical capital accumulation.
In sum, the glass is half full both for neoclassical and endogenous growth theorists:
Poorer countries experienced faster physical capital deepening, and this explains about 50
percent of their relative gains; and they experienced faster TFP growth, accounting for
the remaining 50 percent. But the glass is also half empty for both. Neoclassical growth
theorists may be puzzled by the lack of convergence in human capital. And endogenous
growth theorists may be disoriented by the fact that not all initially poorer countries lagged
the rest technologically, so that their continued faster TFP growth does not square well with
the technology catch-up story that these theorists would probably favor.
Inspection of Figure 2.1 reveals in many cases what may loosely be termed a \struc-
tural break" around 1975 (that fateful year!). Indeed, 1975 looks like the year of accomplished
convergence for several countries. After that year, relative incomes tend to look much more
stable. In the case of Greece there is actually a convergence reversal around 1975. For these
reasons, it seems useful to present additional decomposition results for the 1960 to 1975 pe-
9This may seem puzzling given the apparently bigger swings of physical capital shown in Figure 4.1, but
recall that k
R in equation (1) gets weighted by 0.33.
11riod. This is done in Table 4.2, which is otherwise an exact replica of Table 4.1. Notable
in this table are the truly exceptional relative performances of Greece and Spain during this
sub-period, driven in equal parts by physical capital accumulation and TFP growth in the
former and about two-￿fths by capital and three-￿fths by TFP in the latter. For complete-
ness, in Table 4.3 we also show the convergence decomposition for the 1975 to 2000 period.
Here we see with dismay the reversal of much of Greece’s gains of the previous sub-period,
driven once again in equal parts by a slowdown in capital accumulation and a (relative) tech-
nological falling-back; the solid gains that Portugal keeps posting, again attributable to both
physical capital and TFP growth; and the TFP-driven explosion of Ireland.10
As a robustness check on our conclusions we repeated the capital-TFP convergence
decomposition using country-speci￿c capital shares instead of the common value of 0.33.
Country-speci￿c capital shares have recently been estimated by Gollin (2002) and by Bernanke
and Gurkaynak (2001). Using ￿gures from the latter paper, we found our main conclusion {
that human-capital convergence played a very small role in cross-country productivity con-
vergence { to be very robust. More speci￿cally, the numbers for the contribution of human
capital to convergence change very little. However, for some countries the relative contribu-
tions of physical capital accumulation and technology catch-up do change. In particular, for
Greece in 1960 to 2000, convergence becomes overwhelmingly a matter of TFP convergence,
while for Spain most of the action becomes concentrated on physical capital. Most of France’s
catch-up to the Netherlands becomes technological, while its physical-capital catch-up to Den-
mark and Norway becomes more pronounced (so that, correspondingly, these countries no
longer vastly outpace it in TFP growth). The detailed results using country-speci￿c capital
shares are presented in Tables 4.4 to 4.7.
5 Trade and Structural Transformation
In this section we turn to interpretations (3) and (4) of the European convergence experi-
ence. According to explanation (3), gains from trade following European economic integration
disproportionately bene￿ted the (initially less integrated) poor economies. Explanation (4)
10There are some important di￿erences in results when using the Barro and Lee (2001) data on years of
schooling instead of those of De La Fuente and Domenech (2002). In particular, convergence in human capital
becomes an important source of overall convergence for Greece and Spain. In the former, convergence in human
capital almost entirely displaces convergence in TFP as a source of overall convergence, while in the latter it
grabs half of TFP’s contribution. (Of course, the contribution of physical capital is insensitive to measurement
of human capital.) There are also several changes in the results for the Northerners. In particular, according
to the Barro and Lee data, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway greatly outpace France in human capital
accumulation, so that their convergence from above takes place despite strong divergence in human capital.
Also, Finland’s convergence from below becomes primarily a matter of human capital accumulation.
12is that the initially poorer countries had the productive structure most distorted towards
low-productivity sectors and that they therefore bene￿ted proportionately the most from the
gradual removal of barriers to inter-sectoral mobility.
It is easy to see why these two views can be assessed jointly: They have broadly
opposite predictions on the patterns of structural change we should see across countries.
In particular, by emphasizing specialization according to comparative advantage, the tradi-
tional trade view implies that productivity convergence should be associated with structural
divergence. On the other hand, by envisioning a world in which all countries gradually shift
resources to the greatest value-added sectors, the structural-transformation view predicts that
productivity convergence should be accompanied by convergence in industrial composition
as well.
In order to investigate these two convergence hypotheses we have put together a data
set on the evolution of the industrial composition of output and employment in our 15 coun-
tries. Speci￿cally, we have data on the value-added and number of workers employed in the
following six sectors: (1) agriculture, hunting, and ￿shing (henceforth agriculture); (2) man-
ufacturing, mining, and quarrying (henceforth manufacturing); (3) utilities; (4) construction;
(5) transportation; and (6) everything else (henceforth, services). We would, of course, have
preferred to work with more ￿nely disaggregated data, but this is the best we have been able
to do. We observe these data at ￿ve-year intervals, starting for most countries in 1955 (but
in some cases in 1950 and in some others in 1960). We have assembled these data through
a laborious process of parsing from many di￿erent sources, both international and national.
We give details in the appendix.11
We begin the exploration of these data by looking at a series of graphs. Figure 5.1
shows for each country the evolution over time of the employment shares of agriculture,
manufacturing, and services. (The other three industries together invariably account for a
very small proportion of overall employment.) The textbook pattern of declining employ-
ment share of agriculture, increasing employment share of services, and inverted-U-shaped
employment share of manufacturing is clearly visible in the graphs for most countries.12 This
is little more than a check on the basic reasonableness of our data. Still, it is useful to be
reminded of the sheer magnitude of the di￿erences in industrial composition among Western
European countries in the 1950s. For example, all of the Southerners have employment shares
of agriculture between 40 and 60 percent (roughly the level of the United States in 1880),
while the Northerners have agricultural shares well below 30 percent { and in a few cases
well below 10 percent. Fittingly, our \middle-of-the-road" benchmark, France, is in between,
11Given the paucity of organized information on this subject, especially for the early (and more interesting)
period, the creation of this data set may well be the most important contribution of the present paper.
12See Ngai and Pissarides (2004) for a recent model that matches these empirical regularities.
13with 35 percent. For completeness, Figure 5.2 shows the shares of the three \small" sectors.
They jointly account, on average, for less than 15 percent of total employment.
That all of the club members have been steadily moving out of agriculture and (even-
tually) into services is neither surprising nor conclusive with respect to which interpretation of
European convergence has more explanatory power. The more important question is whether
the various countries are converging towards similar industrial structures { as predicted by
a theory in which all countries shift resources towards the highest value-added sectors {
or towards permanently di￿erent ones { as would be more consistent with a comparative-
advantage explanation for convergence. To try to get a handle on this question, we plot in
Figure 5.3 the sectoral employment shares in Figure 5.1 minus the corresponding shares in
France. We also plot a horizontal line at 0 to better gauge whether the general movement is
towards convergence in employment shares.13
The data show a general tendency towards structural convergence. The Southern-
ers, together with Ireland and Finland, all start out with higher-than-average agricultural
labor shares, but experience a substantial decline in these shares relative to France. Greece,
Portugal, and Austria, though, have not yet closed the gap. The Northerners, in contrast, ex-
perience a signi￿cant increase in agricultural shares relative to France. Manufacturing shares
also show remarkable convergence, with some overshooting in the cases of Portugal, Ireland,
and Italy. The share of labor in services converges quickly for the Northerners, but less so
for the Southerners.
Obviously, if we had all the sectors in the economy, the sum of all the lines would
be zero. The persisting di￿erences between the services shares in Greece and Austria and
the services share in France are the mirror image of the persisting di￿erences between the
corresponding agricultural shares. For Italy, the services gap is made up by a symmetric
gap in manufacturing. For Portugal, Ireland, and Finland, the services di￿erence is partly
compensated for by the overshooting in manufacturing, partly by a persistent gap in agri-
cultural shares, and partly by an increase in these countries’ shares of construction relative
to France’s, which is shown in Figure 5.4, together with the shares of the remaining (small)
sectors relative to the corresponding ones in France.
In sum, at least judging by the coarse evidence of Figure 5.3, the conclusion seems to
be that Western European countries did grow closer in industrial structure over the second
half of the 20th century { as in the \structural-transformation" view of convergence { but
there remain some potentially permanent di￿erences in industrial composition { as in the
\comparative advantage" view.
13The analytics in the next sub-section justify using employment-share di￿erences instead of employment
share ratios.
14Another way to think about trade is to look at the relative labor productivities in
the various sectors. In particular, under a comparative-advantage interpretation we would
expect non-convergence to occur in those sectors in which labor productivity relative to the
\average country" is relatively higher. For this reason, and also because it is interesting in
and of itself, we plot in Figure 5.5 each sector’s output per worker as a ratio of France’s
output per worker in the same sector. (We continue to choose France as a plausible stand-in
for the average country).
We draw two lessons from these graphs. First, over time there has been signi￿cant
convergence in the labor productivities of the various sectors towards French sectoral labor
productivity levels. We will return to this important within-industry productivity convergence
process shortly. Second, and more directly relevant to the discussion at hand, it actually
does not look as if the remaining di￿erences in industrial structure that seem to emerge from
Figure 5.3 are dictated by comparative advantage. For example, looking at recent years,
Italy seems to have a comparative advantage in services and a comparative disadvantage
in manufacturing. Yet, as we have seen, its pattern of specialization has tilted towards
manufacturing. Greece, which specializes in agriculture, has a comparative advantage in
everything but.14;15 An alternative way to look at this is through the plot of di￿erences in
sectoral shares with France against relative productivity.
Clearly, this reading of the data relies on all sectors being tradable. One may object,
however, that services are very likely less tradable than both manufacturing and agriculture.
Restricting the analysis to these two sectors, Greece does not exhibit any clear pattern of
comparative advantage vis-￿ a-vis France. Austria and Portugal seem to have a comparative
advantage in manufacturing. But then it is certainly di￿cult for the comparative-advantage
view to explain why Greece, Austria, and Portugal have larger shares of agriculture than
France. Ignoring services, Italy and Spain exhibit a comparative advantage in agriculture with
respect to France until 1970, when the comparative advantage shifts in favor of manufacturing.
A similar pattern emerges for Ireland, although the shift occurs more than two decades later.
Throughout most of the period, and again at odds with the comparative-advantage view, the
shares of agriculture in Spain, Italy, and Ireland, although declining, have been systematically
larger than that in France.
14Comparative advantage should be judged against all trading partners and not only France. So, for
example, if other trading partners had signi￿cantly higher productivity in all sectors relative to agriculture
when compared with Greece, we could rationalize the fact that Greece specializes in agriculture. However,
looking at the ￿gures we see that this criterion would imply that all other EU members (except for Austria,
Germany, and perhaps Norway) should also specialize in agriculture! Note also that Austria, which should
not, according to this view, specialize in agriculture, has a relatively large agricultural labor force.
15For completeness, Figure 5.6 shows the sectoral labor productivities of the three small sectors.
15We now turn the focus to the structuralist interpretation of the data. Let us reca-
pitulate that story. First, there are some sectors that are intrinsically more productive than
others. Second, there are labor-market distortions that prevent the ￿ow of resources to the
more productive sectors, with the result that even in equilibrium one observes di￿erences
in value-added per worker. Third, these imperfections notwithstanding, resources do grad-
ually ￿ow toward the more productive sectors, leading to catch-up by the countries whose
industrial structure was initially most distorted.
As a ￿rst step to evaluating this view, we plot, for each country, the levels of sectoral
labor productivity relative to agricultural productivity. These plots are displayed in Figure
5.7. It is clear from this ￿gure that, for all countries, and throughout the entire period,
agriculture is the least productive sector. The (weak) exceptions are the U.K. before 1975,
for which the productivity levels of the three sectors are very close, the Netherlands before
1970, and Sweden between 1975 and 1990, for which the productivity gap of services over
agriculture is nil. To the extent that poorer countries experience ￿ows of labor away from
agriculture larger than the Northerners, these productivity gaps should be a source of overall
productivity convergence. As we saw above, this has indeed been the case: Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Ireland, and Italy have experienced substantial declines in their shares of agriculture
relative to France, whereas the Northerners, having started out with relatively small shares
of agriculture, experienced a relative increase in agricultural shares (always with respect to
France).
While the inter-sectoral productivity gaps are generally large, there are few clear
general trends in their behavior over time. In several countries the gap between the high-
productivity sectors (services and manufacturing) and the low-productivity sectors (agricul-
ture) has been slowly closing over the period. This is the case for Greece, Spain, Italy,
Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and our reference country, France. However, in all
these cases, the inter-sectoral productivity gaps remain well above 50 percent. For Portugal,
the productivity gap in favor of manufacturing declines until 1980, stabilizes during the eight-
ies, and then shoots up decisively, together with the productivity advantage of the services
sector, which shows no trend in the earlier period. In the U.K., the Netherlands, and Norway,
we see a sizeable increase in the productivity premium of manufacturing starting in the mid
seventies. Ireland shows a similar pattern, although the increase starts in 1980. Austria ex-
hibits signi￿cant increases in the productivity advantage of both services and manufacturing
relative to agriculture in the sixties. Belgium’s experience is an attenuated and more gradual
version of Austria’s.
For the sake of completeness, Figure 5.8 shows the labor productivity of the remaining
(small) sectors relative to agriculture. Again there are no uniform trends across countries.
16What strikes the eye is that the utilities sector is substantially more productive than the two
other sectors and agriculture, although this is neither very surprising (given that the utility
sector is not labor-intensive), nor very relevant (as utilities account on average for less than
2 percent of the labor force). Far below utilities, the next sector in this B-league ranking is
transportation and the third and last is construction (although in some countries { such as
Greece { and in some sporadic years, the ranking between these two is reversed).16
This discussion so far suggests the following tentative conclusion. Initially poorer
Western European countries converged to France because: (i) The productivity of the sectors
in which they specialized converged to the productivity of the same sectors in France { this
is the within industry productivity convergence documented in Figure 5.5; (ii) They moved a
larger share of their workforce towards the higher productivity sectors { this is the pattern
of convergence in sectoral composition of the labor force documented in Figure 5.3; and (iii)
(For some of these countries) there was a generalized convergence of the productivity of the
sectors in which they had a disproportionate share of the labor force to the productivity of
the sectors in which France was specialized { when and where this inter-sectoral productivity
convergence occurred can be seen in Figure 5.7. We turn now to a quantitative assessment
of these three channels.
5.1 Convergence Decomposition: Analytics
Let us call yi
jt the per worker value added in country i, sector j; at time t: Denote
by ai
jt the share of employment in country i, sector j; at time t. Total value added per
worker in country i at time t, yi









16As we mentioned, new trade theories not grounded on comparative advantage are harder to di￿erentiate
from the structural-transformation view in that they do not necessarily predict that integration leads to struc-
tural divergence. We observe, however, that if trade-induced scale economies had been an important source
of catch-up for the Southerners we should see their tradable sectors (agriculture and/or manufacturing) sys-
tematicaly outpace their non-tradable sectors (services, utilities, construction, and electricity) in productivity
gains. It is hard to discern any such systematic pattern in Figures 5.7 and 5.8.
17As always, we use France, i = F; as the numeraire for our convergence analysis. We thus




















This measure of convergence is convenient because it can be exactly decomposed into the
three channels mentioned in our previous discussion: i) within-industry convergence, ii) con-
vergence due to labor reallocation, and iii) inter-sectoral, or between-industry convergence.





























































































































In the tables that follow, we call \Total convergence" the quantity on the left-hand
side in equation (3). \Within-industry convergence" is the quantity on the ￿rst line of the
right-hand side; this captures the productivity catch-up of each sector with the corresponding
one in France, weighted by the average labor share in that sector. \Labor reallocation" is
17Note that the two expressions we study in our convergence decomposition exercises are, to a ￿rst-order






















































18the quantity in the second line that quanti￿es the part of convergence due to inter-sectoral
workforce movements; it is appropriately weighted by the relative productivity of the sector.
In particular, in the special case where there are no within-industry labor productivity gaps
(yi
jt = yF
jt), labor reallocation contributes to convergence if and only if country i transfers
a larger share of the labor force than does France towards the high-productivity industries.
If there are within-industry productivity gaps, this e￿ect may be attenuated. Speci￿cally, if
sector j is much more productive in France than in country i, labor reallocation may lead
to divergence even if France is moving fewer workers towards this sector. Finally, \between-
industry convergence" is the quantity in the third line; it measures the contribution to con-
vergence of inter-sectoral productivity convergence. In particular, if the productivity of the
sectors in which a country had a disproportionate share of the labor force converges to the
overall productivity of France, we will see convergence.
We perform this decomposition for the whole period, 1960 through 2000, for which
sectoral data are available in all countries (except for Ireland, which has data beginning in
1970). The results are summarized in Table 5.1. Panel A shows the convergence decomposi-
tion in absolute terms. The ￿rst column shows the total productivity convergence to France
from 1960 through 2000 (for Ireland, we report the ￿gures for 1970 to 2000). These are









t , as noted before). As we already know, six
countries experienced substantial convergence from below: Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Austria,
Italy, and Greece. The other countries converged from above or remained at roughly the
same level as France.
The three following columns in Panel A show the quantitative magnitudes of the three
sources of convergence. The corresponding columns in Panel B show the contribution of each
source as a percent of total convergence. These numbers are illustrated in Figure 5.10, which
shows graphically the contribution to convergence of the di￿erent components. Interestingly,
the true Southerners { Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal { achieved convergence mainly by
reallocation of the labor force from low- to high-productivity sectors (at a faster rate than
France, as always). Labor reallocation accounts for about 60 percent of total convergence in
Spain and Portugal, 100 percent in Italy, and more than 100 percent in Greece (other elements
played against convergence in this country). Hence, for the true Southerners, we ￿nd a lot
of support for what we called the \structuralist" view of convergence. Labor reallocation is
also quite important for the convergence of France to the U.K., as it accounts for about 50
percent of it. (An important part of the story here is that agricultural shares declined much
more slowly in the U.K. than in France.)
Austria and Ireland, instead, converged mainly through within-industry productivity
19catch-up. The within-industry mechanism is also behind the convergence of the Northerners,
accounting in all cases for more than 60 percent of the total convergence. Within-industry
productivity convergence is not well accounted for by either the trade view or the structural-
transformation view. Rather, it probably has more to do with the capital deepening and
technology catch-up processes highlighted in the previous section.
Given the qualitative evidence from Figure 5.7 it is not surprising that the third
component of the sectoral decomposition of convergence, between-industry productivity con-
vergence, is never the most important factor. Indeed, in most cases it is the least important
source of convergence { and in some cases it even operates in the direction of divergence.
Nevertheless, in the case of Greece, inter-sectoral productivity convergence has been fairly
important. In particular, Greece bene￿ted from the productivity gains of agriculture, given
its large share in this sector. Portugal and Spain also gained some ground thanks to this
between-industry catch-up, although the quantitative contribution of this source has not been
as substantial.
Before concluding and summarizing this section we take a brief look at the role of
sectoral developments in shaping convergence dynamics in di￿erent sub-periods. Hence, we
decompose each of the terms in (3) into the two sub-periods 1960 through 1975 (60-75) and
1975 through 2000 (75-00). We now introduce sub-indices to indicate the period to which





























































































































































































































































































































































































































Between-industry conv. 75-00 Between-industry conv. 60-75
Table 5.2 looks at the within-industry convergence in the two sub-periods 1960 through
1975 and 1975 through 2000. As mentioned before, Austria and Ireland converged mainly
through within-industry catch-up. However, in the case of Austria, this catching up took
21place very early: More than 90 percent of the within-industry productivity gain took place
in the ￿rst sub-period, whereas in the case of Ireland, more than 90 percent of the catch-up
took place in the second sub-period. As for the Northerners, typically more than two thirds
of the within-industry convergence took place in the ￿rst sub-period. The only exception
is Germany, which exhibits signi￿cant convergence in the second sub-period, clearly due to
the addition of East Germany. An interesting case is Greece, which lost signi￿cant ground
in terms of within-industry productivity in the second period. This source of divergence is
behind the reversal in relative overall productivity noted in Figure 2.1.
Table 5.3 shows the part of the convergence due to labor reallocation in each of the
sub-periods. About 50 percent of the labor-reallocation-induced convergence experienced by
the Southerners took place in the ￿rst 15 years. This fraction is even larger for Greece in this
sub-period (65 percent), so we can conclude that Greece converged through labor reallocation
in the 1960s and early 1970s and subsequently diverged by losing within-industry relative
productivity. For the Northerners, more than 50 percent of the convergence due to labor
reallocation appears to have taken place in the ￿rst sub-period, except for Norway, where
the contribution of the early period’s reallocation was 20 percent. All in all, then, these 15
years witness substantial convergence induced by labor reallocation. As discussed early on,
this is primarily driven by the relatively faster decline in agricultural shares experienced by
the deep Southerners. Recall that Austria, in contrast with the deep Southerners, started
with a relatively low share of agriculture, and hence there was little action on this margin.
Ireland started out with a somewhat higher agricultural share than Austria, but a share still
well below the corresponding ones of the true Southerners.18
Summing up to here, the deep Southerners { Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy {
converged mainly through labor reallocation, with about half of it taking place between
1960 and 1975. In the case of Greece, this e￿ect was counterbalanced in 1975 by signi￿cant
losses in within-industry productivity. The other (real or honorary) Southerners, Austria
and Ireland, converged mainly through within-industry productivity gains, most of which
occurred in the ￿rst 15 years for Austria and in the second sub-period for Ireland. France
converged to the Northerners mainly through the within-industry channel, although in the
U.K. labor reallocation also played an important role.
Our tentative overall conclusion on the Western European convergence experience
is as follows. First, at least by the admittedly coarse standards we have applied, sectoral
specialization according to comparative advantage has not been a critical source of catching up
by the initially poorer countries. Instead, disproportionately large labor reallocation towards
18For completeness Table 5.4 shows the between-industry catch-up in the two sub-periods. We do not linger
on this table because we saw in Table 5.1 that this mechanism did not play a prominent role for most countries.
22more productive sectors has contributed substantially to the convergence of Portugal, Spain,
Greece, and Italy towards average Western European levels of labor productivity. Second, we
also see substantial within-industry labor productivity convergence, and this was especially
important in the catching up of Austria and Ireland. This within-industry labor productivity
convergence is probably best understood in the light of the substantial relative gains in
physical capital per worker and total factor productivity by poorer countries documented in
the previous section. It is probably not linked to human-capital deepening.19
6 The Easterners
Enough with latitude: Let’s turn to longitude. As mentioned in the Introduction, rel-
ative to France, labor productivity in Eastern Europe is roughly where it was in Southern
Europe before the South staged its catch-up. Given what we have learned about some of
the mechanics of this catch-up, we can try to speculate about the Easterners’ prospects. In
particular, we can ask two sets of questions. The ￿rst set of questions is based on the analysis
of Section 4. How much do gaps in physical capital per worker, human capital, and TFP
account for the overall productivity gap of the Easterners relative to France? How do these
three gaps compare with the corresponding gaps prevailing in Southern Europe in 1960?
The second set of questions is linked to the analysis in Section 5. How does the industrial
structure of the Easterners di￿er from France’s? How do these di￿erences compare to the
corresponding di￿erences in Southern Europe before the catch-up?
We begin, however, by brie￿y reviewing the aggregate picture. Figure 6.1 plots current
levels of labor productivity relative to France in 13 \Eastern-European" countries: the 10
admitted into the EU in May 2004, plus three candidates, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.
For comparison, we also plot the corresponding relative productivities in the ￿ve Southerners
in 1960. (For these aggregate GDP comparisons we could have plotted the 1950 values for
the Southerners, but { for reasons already discussed above { the earliest available date for the
disaggregated comparisons we present later is typically 1960. Hence, we chose to write this
section with 1960 as the benchmark). To continue with the geographic theme, these relative
productivities are plotted in increasing order of longitude. As before, these productivity data
come from PWT.
The Easterners are very unproductive relative to France. In fact, their real produc-
19Needless to say, intersectoral reallocation of labor also contributes to overall capital deepening and TFP
gains if labor ￿ows towards more capital-intensive and e￿cient sectors. It would indeed be very interesting
to be able to decompose the capital and TFP convergence of the previous section into a within-industry
relative capital deepening and TFP growth component and a component linked to sectoral reallocation. At
the moment we do not have the data to do this.
23tivity gap with France is on average substantially larger than the Southerners’ productivity
gap in 1960. The exceptions are Malta (which is where Austria was then), Cyprus (between
Spain and Austria), Slovenia (similar to Spain in 1960), and Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Slovakia (at about Portugal’s level back then). Some of the other countries are far below
these levels and indeed considerably poorer (in relative terms) than the Southerners were
even in 1950. Romania’s relative productivity, 15 percent, is especially low.
What are the sources of these large productivity gaps? One way to answer this
question is presented in Figure 6.2, which shows physical capital gaps, that is, levels of
physical capital per worker relative to France (￿rst panel); human capital gaps (second panel);
TFP gaps (third panel); and investment gaps (fourth panel). The physical capital stocks and
TFPs of the Easterners are constructed in the same way as the corresponding variables for
Western European countries in Section 4. Unfortunately, we have long time series on real
investment rates for only ￿ve of the Easterners, which explains the thinner data clouds in the
￿rst and third panels. The human capital stocks are also constructed as in Section 4, except
that now we must use the Barro and Lee (2001) data as the De La Fuente and Domenech
(2002) data set does not cover these countries. Relative capital stocks and relative TFPs are
plotted against relative labor productivities. The solid line in each graph is the 45-degree
line.
Once again, the most striking feature of this decomposition seems to pertain to human
capital: Most of the Easterners have current levels of human capital above those of France.
Only Slovenia, Malta, and Turkey have fewer average years of schooling than France, and only
the last one substantially so. Hence, one conclusion is that among the Easterners, Turkey
is the only country whose productivity gap with France is partially explained by a human-
capital gap. This was not generally true for the Southerners in 1960: Portugal, Greece, Spain,
and Italy all had signi￿cantly lower human capital than France. Since human capital gaps
seem to be very persistent (see Section 4), this may be viewed as very good news for the
Easterners: The handicap that is toughest to overcome is one they do not have.
For the countries with available long investment series, physical capital gaps are
large. Indeed, by checking relative physical capital levels against the 45-degree line, we can
see that in most cases physical capital gaps are even larger (though not by much) than
real productivity gaps. The same was true in 1960 of Portugal, Greece, and Spain. Not
surprisingly, for the same countries we also see TFP gaps that are large, but not as large as
the labor productivity gaps. The Southerners had smaller TFP gaps, even controlling for the
level of relative income. (This makes up for their lower relative human capital.) In sum, it
would appear that for the Easterners to converge, what is required is a combination of capital
deepening faster than that of the West and technological catch-up. This is exactly what the
24Southerners did. However, the Southerners’ initial disadvantage was not as large, so it may
be presumed that the Easterners’ convergence will take somewhat longer.
One way to see whether the Easterners appear to be on the path to catch up in
physical capital levels is to look at investment shares of GDP. These are shown in the fourth
panel of Figure 6.2. (Examining these shares is a way of extending the assessment of the
physical capital position of a larger number of Eastern European countries.) Judging from
the position of relative investment vis-￿ a-vis the 45-degree line, in 1960 the Southerners had
investment shares relative to France somewhat higher than their labor productivities relative
to France. The same seems to be broadly true today of the Easterners. This is reassuring.
We now turn to industrial structure. The discussion that follows is based on the data
reported in Table 6.1 or shown in its graphical equivalent, Figure 6.3, which plots against
total productivity (i) the di￿erence in sectoral shares (resh) of each country with respect to
France, (ii) the relative sectoral productivity (rely) of each country with respect to France,
and (iii) the relative productivity of manufacturing and services vis-￿ a-vis agriculture for each
country (secty). Table 6.1 begins by reporting di￿erences in employment shares of the three
main sectors vis-￿ a-vis France { in 1960 for the Southerners and in 2000 for the Easterners.
Once again, sectoral data construction is described in the Appendix.
There is signi￿cant variance in the relative shares of agriculture both within the
group of Southerners and within the group of Easterners. Romania and Turkey exhibit
the highest agricultural share relative to France. The agricultural share in Romania is 40
percentage points higher than that in France; in Turkey it is 30 percentage points higher.
The closest parallel in 1960 is Greece, with roughly a 35-percentage-point di￿erence over
France. Poland and Bulgaria are closer to Spain, with a di￿erence in shares vis-￿ a-vis France
of about 20 percentage points. Latvia and Lithuania resemble Italy in 1960. If the historical
experience of their Southern counterparts is any guide, there seems to be a substantial margin
for convergence through labor reallocation for all these countries. In Hungary, Estonia, the
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, di￿erences in labor shares in agriculture with respect to France
are lower (somewhere between the corresponding share di￿erentials in Austria and Italy in
1960), while Malta, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic have agricultural labor shares that are
very close to those in France (as was the case for Austria in 1960).
Labor shares in manufacturing are larger than France’s for all Easterners, except
Cyprus, which exhibits approximately the same share as France. On these dimensions, then,
the situation is quite di￿erent from the Southerners’ in 1960, when manufacturing shares
were systematically below those in France (except for Austria, whose share was very close to
France’s).
Services, broadly speaking, take up the slack between these sectors. Romania, Turkey,
25Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Bulgaria have services shares that are
well below the corresponding shares in France in 2000, and the di￿erences are remarkably
higher (in absolute terms) than those exhibited by the Southerners in 1960. Continuing
with the parallel between the two years, Hungary looks like Greece, Slovenia like Portugal,
Lithuania like Spain, and Estonia and Latvia like Italy.
Turning to sectoral productivity (fourth to seventh columns of Table 6.1, second row
of Figure 6.3), the Easterners in 1960 are on average signi￿cantly less productive vis-￿ a-vis
France than the Southerners were in 1960. In particular, with three exceptions, agricultural
productivity relative to France is lower for all Easterners than it was for Greece { the country
with the lowest relative agricultural productivity in 1960. The exceptions are the Czech
Republic, whose relative agricultural productivity is comparable to that in Portugal in 1960;
Cyprus, with relative productivity comparable to Spain’s; and a big outlier, Malta, whose
agricultural productivity is well above France’s in 2000.
There are also big contrasts in manufacturing productivity. The Easterners’ produc-
tivity is remarkably lower than that in France, and the productivity gap is again higher than
that exhibited by the Southerners in 1960. Ten out of the 13 Easterners show productivity
levels well below 50 percent of France’s. The relative productivities for these 10 countries
range from 19 percent in Romania to 43 percent in Hungary. In 1960, even Greece, the least
productive country in manufacturing, was in a better position, with a productivity equal to
53 percent of France’s. This is quite remarkable, given that { as we just mentioned { the
industrial production of the Easterners is tilted towards manufacturing. The productivity
gaps for Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta ￿nd some counterparts in the Southerners in 1960.
Slovenia’s relative productivity is similar to that of Portugal. Cyprus’s relative productivity
falls between that in Spain and Italy, and Malta’s compares with Austria’s.
A similar picture emerges in services. With the three small exceptions { Cyprus,
Malta, and Slovenia { the Easterners’ productivity in services is much lower than France’s,
and productivity gaps are larger than those shown by the Southerners in 1960. Labor produc-
tivity relative to France’s ranges from 32 percent to 57 percent for the Easterners|without
counting the three exceptions|whereas the lowest value for the Southerners in 1960 was 70
percent (in Portugal). Slovenia’s relative productivity (77 percent) falls between those of Por-
tugal and Austria, while Cyprus’s and Malta’s productivities fall between the corresponding
ones in Austria and Spain
The last two columns of Table 6.1 (and the last row of Figure 6.3) take up inter-
sectoral productivity di￿erentials. For the Southerners in 1960 manufacturing was between
two to three times as productive as agriculture. The corresponding range for services was
about two to ￿ve. In the East we ￿nd more variation. At one extreme, Malta’s agriculture
26is (slightly) more productive than are the other sectors. At the other, Polish manufacturing
is eight times as productive as agriculture, and services ten times! Romania also has an ex-
traordinarily unproductive agriculture, vis-￿ a-vis the other sectors. On balance, and weighted
by population, we can conclude that inter-sectoral productivity di￿erentials in the East are
at least as large as they were in the South in 1960.
In sum, there are some broad qualitative similarities between the Easterners today
and the Southerners in 1960. First, both groups have large shares of their workforce in their
least productive sectors. Poland’s large share of agriculture illustrates this massive failure of
comparative advantage particularly strikingly. But Malta and Estonia also appear to have
manufacturing shares that are too big.20 Second, there is a component of the productivity
gap that is not due to sectoral structure but to within-industry productivity di￿erentials. We
brie￿y turn now to a quantitative assessment of these similarities.










































The left-hand side is the aggregate productivity gap between France and country i, as a
percentage of country i’s income. The right-hand side decomposes this gap into three com-
ponents. The ￿rst term is the \within-industry" component. Holding constant country i’s
sectoral employment shares, it answers the question by how much would country i’s income in-
crease if its sectoral labor productivities converged to the productivities of the corresponding
sectors in France? The second term is the \between-industry component." Holding constant
country i’s sectoral labor productivities, it asks by how much would country i’s output per
worker increase if its employment shares were the same as France’s. The third component is
a \covariance" term.
The results of this decomposition are reported in Table 6.2. The ￿rst column is the
productivity gap on the left-hand side of equation (4), while columns 2 to 4 report the three
pieces on the right-hand side. The top panel, reserved to the Southerners in 1960, shows
that broadly speaking within-industry productivity gaps and sectoral composition were both
important determinants of the productivity gaps of these countries. The between component
was larger than the within component for Italy and Greece, while the within component
dominated for Austria, Spain, and Portugal.
The bottom panel reports decomposition results for the Easterners. Consistent with
our previous discussion, we ￿nd enormous within-industry productivity di￿erences. For some
20This failure of comparative advantage has been noted more broadly. For example, developing countries
have huge employment shares of agriculture and much lower relative labor productivity in this sector than in
the rest of the economy. For example, Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2001).
27of the poorest countries, within-industry productivity convergence (holding constant employ-
ment shares) would lead to a four-fold increase in aggregate labor productivity. Also, as
expected, the within-industry component of the income gap with France is much larger than
was the case for the Southerners in 1960.
What is new and somewhat unexpected in Table 6.2 is the relatively limited role of
the between-industry component. Despite their large employment shares in the relatively
unproductive industries, for 8 out of the 18 Eastern European countries the income gap due
to the structure of employment is less than 10 percent (that is, moving to French employ-
ment shares holding constant labor productivities would increase output by less than 10
percent). As a result, the between component explains a relatively modest fraction of the
overall productivity gap with France. In comparison, except for Austria, the Southerners
had substantially larger between components, both in absolute terms and as a percent of the
overall income gap. The smaller role of the between component is particularly evident if one
compares South and North at similar levels of the income gap with France.
Nevertheless, for some of the largest and poorest countries, labor reallocation towards
the more productive sectors would make a substantial di￿erence. In the case of Poland it
would raise income by 27 percent { hardly enough to bridge the gap with France, but certainly
important in absolute terms. Similarly, attaining French sectoral employment shares would
increase income per worker by 32 percent in Turkey, 19 percent in Bulgaria, and 68 percent
in Romania.
To summarize, then, we could say the following. In the South, structural imbalances
towards the low-productivity sectors were important determinants of their initial income
gaps vis-￿ a-vis France, and a big part of their convergence experience is associated with the
reallocation of resources towards greater value-added industries. These structural distortions
are also present today in the East. Indeed, some of the poorest and largest countries can
look forward to meaningful labor productivity gains from inter-sectoral labor reallocation.
However, in contrast with the story in the South, these potential gains constitute a relatively
small share of their overall income gap. Hence, to the extent that productivity gains through
structural reshu￿ing are a relatively low-hanging fruit, one comes away from this evidence
somewhat less bullish about the prospects of fast convergence by the Easterners.
Nevertheless, the news is not all bad. The South also had sizable within-industry
productivity gaps { as well as between-industry ones { and was able to bridge most of these
gaps through physical capital accumulation and TFP growth. One can only presume that
the East will be able to replicate this experience. Furthermore, whatever gaps remain in the
South are due to a failure to catch up in human capital. If anything, then, the Easterners
should do even better in the long run, as they face no permanent handicap arising from human
28capital di￿erentials. But the fact that the within-industry gaps are much larger, coupled with
having to rely exclusively on the \within" margin (and not also on the \between" margin),
suggests that the long run may take a long time to arrive.
7 Conclusions
In 1950, the average Spanish worker generated goods and services worth little more than
60 percent of the goods and services generated by the average French worker. By 1970, the
ratio was 90 percent. How did this happen? The data suggest that a critical mechanism
for Spain’s explosive catch-up has been a vast redeployment of labor out of agriculture and
towards higher value-added sectors. This redeployment was going on in France as well, but
because Spain started out with a much larger agricultural sector, it bene￿ted disproportion-
ately. The sectors receiving these labor ￿ows are presumably more productive because they
are characterized by higher capital intensity and higher total factor productivity. Consistent
with this conjecture, we see Spain’s overall capital-labor ratio and TFP catching up strongly
with France’s. However, a secondary but not trivial part of Spain’s convergence to France
is the catch-up of labor productivity within sectors: For example, Spanish manufacturing
was 60 percent as productive as French manufacturing in 1960, but by 1970 this ratio had
increased to 87 percent. Hence, presumably, not all of the overall convergence in physical
capital and TFP is linked to the structural transformation: Some of it is driven by relative
productivity trends within industries. Despite substantial convergence in sectoral structure,
physical capital per worker, and TFP, Spanish average labor productivity has hovered at
around 90 percent of French average labor productivity since the mid-1970s . Our data indi-
cate that this persistent remaining gap is due mostly to an equally persistent gap in human
capital per worker.
In 2000, the average Polish worker generated goods and services worth 41 percent
of those produced by the average French worker. Various elements contribute to this low
productivity. As was true for Spain in 1960, a substantially large fraction of workers in
Poland is employed in agriculture. The di￿erence between the labor shares of Poland and
France is above 22 percentage points. As was true for Spain then, this disproportionate
share of agriculture ￿ies in the face of economic e￿ciency. The average worker in agriculture
in Poland produces less than 9 percent of what his counterpart produces in France, while
the relative productivities of manufacturing and services are, respectively 40 percent and 56
percent. There is, therefore, substantial scope for e￿cient labor reallocation in the country.
However, these numbers also imply that { once again { as was true for Spain in 1960, there is
also a big margin for within-industry productivity catch-up. Indeed, quantitatively, the case
of Poland is quite di￿erent from the case of Spain, as most of the aggregate productivity gap
29with France is attributable to these within-industry productivity gaps. Hence, for Poland,
the road to convergence passes through physical-capital deepening and TFP gains at the
industry level. This means that convergence may take quite a bit longer. On the other hand,
unlike Spain, Poland could actually look forward to a complete catch-up, as it is not hobbled
by a human-capital handicap.
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33APPENDIX ON SECTORAL DATA
Data on PPP-adjusted real GDP per worker and total employment come from the
Penn World Tables 6.1. Real GDP per worker is the variable RGDPWOK and total em-





Shares of sectoral GDP and sectoral employment were computed from the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s \STAN Database for Industrial
Analysis," Volume 2004, release 03. This database reports the value-added at basic prices
(named VALU) and employment (EMPN) by sector (ISIC Rev. 3) from 1970 to 2000. The
countries covered (and used in our analysis) are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. There are,
however, missing values for some countries/years, which we completed using the OECD’s \Na-
tional Accounts of OECD Countries" (Detailed Tables, Volume II, 1970-2001). The variables
used are Valu-B (value-added at basic prices), and ETOP (number of persons employed).21
Both STAN and National Accounts are available online through SourceOECD.
For data on sectoral value-added in the period 1950 through 1970, and for missing
values in SourceOECD during 1970 through 2000, we use sectoral value-added from various
printed editions of the OECD’s \National Accounts of OECD Countries" (Volume II). In
particular, for 1950-1965, we use Table 3 of the 1950-1969 Volume. For 1970-1980, we use
Table 12 of the 1970-1982 Volume. For 1985-1990 we use Table 12 of the 1983-1995 Volume,
and for 1995 we use Table 7 of the 1989-2000 Volume. (Note that, while available in the books,
the information is not always provided by the electronic version of \National Accounts of
OECD Countries.")22 For Portugal, \Construction" and \Manufacturing" are aggregated in
21Data for Turkey are available from this source.
22There are some di￿erences in the classi￿cation across books, for which we performed the appropriate
adjustments. In particular, in the ￿rst volume, some countries do not separate between \Mining and Quar-
rying" and \Manufacturing." We created an additional industry (Mining and Quarrying and Manufacturing)
with these aggregated data. For countries that do report separately \Mining and Quarrying" and \Man-
ufacturing," the aggregate industry is the sum of the two. An analogous rationale is behind the sectors
Public administration, education, and health services, which are aggregated under Community Services. To
match the categories between the ￿rst two periods in the books and the latter ones, we match \Banking etc."
with \Finance etc." \Owenrship of dwellings" is always aggregated with \Finance, etc." in the latter issues.
Hence we aggregate them through the whole sample. \Public administration" is matched with \Producers of
Government Services." \Health and Education" is matched with \Community, Social, and Personal Services."
341955; we split them by applying the corresponding shares obtained from Bank of Portugal’s
\S￿ eries Longas para a Economia Portuguesa p￿ os II Guerra Mundial," available online at
http://www.bportugal.pt/.
For sectoral employment information missing from SourceOECD during 1970 through
2000, we use employment data from the International Labor O￿ce (ILO)’s \LABORSTA
Labour Statistics Database," available on line at http://laborsta.ilo.org/. For the period 1950
through 1970, we use data from \ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics - Retrospective Edition -
Population Censuses," along with three editions (1961, 1966, and 1972) of the Book \ILO
Yearbook of Labor Statistics." The general strategy is to use overlapping years across di￿erent
volumes to construct a consistent series. In the case of Italy, for 1965 we split some sectors
that were aggregated using the corresponding shares of 1966. Still, labor share data were
missing for some country-years. We completed them using Table 1, page 20*, of the \Annuaire
Statistique de la France 1972," edited by the Institut National de la Statisque et des Etudes
Economiques (INSEE). From this report, we used data for France and the United Kingdom
(taking the ￿gures in 1954 in lieu of 1955, which were missing; we also took the averages
between 1958 and 1962 in lieu of 1960, and 1964 in lieu of 1965). We used these data also
for Italy and Spain, in combination with the ILO’s Yearbook of Labor Statistics data (for
1955 we used 1954; for 1960 we used the average of 1958 and 1962). Finally, we ￿lled in data
for Spain in 1965 using data from the book \Poblaci￿ on, Actividad y Ocupaci￿ on en Espa~ na:
Reconstrucci￿ on de la series hist￿ oricas: 1960-1978."
Given that part of the data are based on ISIC. Rev. 1, ISIC Rev. 2 and part are based
on ISIC Rev 3., we converted the data into a maximum common denominator. The resulting
sectors are 1) Agriculture, Fishing, Forestry and Hunting; 2) Manufacturing, Mining and
Quarrying; 3) Construction; 4) Transport, Storage, and Communications; 5) Electricity, Gas,
and Water; and 5) Services (including Trade, Restaurants and Hotels, Finance, Insurance,
Real State and Business Services, and Community, Social, and Personal Services).
For a group of Easterners, SourceOECD has complete data in 2000. This group
includes Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey. For the remaining East-
erners, we took the sectoral shares of GDP and employment from the 2002 regular reports by
the European Economic Commission on each country’s progress towards accession. Hence,
data for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Malta come
from this source.
Sectoral value-added and sectoral employment are obtained by applying the sectoral
shares to total real GDP and employment from the Penn World Tables.
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36                   Figure 2.1: GDP per Worker Relative to France
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38                      Figure 4.1: Capital Intensity and TFP Relative to France
Greece
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Greece 0.24 0.10 0.01 0.12 Greece 0.39 0.21 -0.03 0.21 Greece -0.15 -0.10 0.04 -0.09
Portugal 0.37 0.18 -0.04 0.23 Portugal 0.12 0.03 -0.03 0.12 Portugal 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.11
Spain 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.14 Spain 0.39 0.16 -0.06 0.29 Spain -0.10 -0.01 0.06 -0.15
Italy 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.15 Italy 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.09 Italy 0.10 -0.01 0.04 0.07
Austria 0.20 0.08 -0.02 0.13 Austria 0.12 0.06 -0.05 0.11 Austria 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.02
Germany -0.18 -0.11 0.00 -0.07 Germany -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 Germany -0.12 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03
Belgium 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.15 Belgium 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.08 Belgium 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.06
United Kingdom -0.24 -0.04 -0.05 -0.14 United Kingdom -0.29 -0.04 -0.04 -0.21 United Kingdom 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.06
Netherlands -0.30 -0.17 0.01 -0.14 Netherlands -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08 Netherlands -0.14 -0.10 0.03 -0.07
Ireland 0.61 0.11 -0.03 0.54 Ireland -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 Ireland 0.64 0.18 0.01 0.45
Denmark -0.25 -0.17 -0.14 0.06 Denmark -0.27 -0.11 -0.06 -0.10 Denmark 0.02 -0.06 -0.08 0.15
Sweden -0.33 -0.20 -0.01 -0.11 Sweden -0.20 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 Sweden -0.13 -0.09 0.01 -0.06
Norway -0.05 -0.16 -0.10 0.21 Norway -0.19 -0.14 -0.06 0.01 Norway 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 0.20

















Greece 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.21 Greece 0.39 0.09 -0.02 0.32 Greece -0.15 -0.09 0.05 -0.11
Portugal 0.37 0.18 -0.05 0.24 Portugal 0.12 0.04 -0.04 0.12 Portugal 0.25 0.14 -0.01 0.12
Spain 0.29 0.24 -0.02 0.07 Spain 0.39 0.22 -0.07 0.24 Spain -0.10 0.03 0.05 -0.17
Italy 0.17 0.04 0.01 0.12 Italy 0.08 0.03 -0.02 0.07 Italy 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.05
Austria 0.20 0.13 -0.03 0.10 Austria 0.12 0.09 -0.05 0.09 Austria 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01
Germany -0.18 -0.03 -0.02 -0.13 Germany -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.08 Germany -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05
Belgium 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.13 Belgium 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 Belgium 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.06
United Kingdom -0.24 -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 United Kingdom -0.29 -0.04 -0.04 -0.20 United Kingdom 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.07
Netherlands -0.30 -0.07 -0.01 -0.22 Netherlands -0.16 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 Netherlands -0.14 -0.06 0.01 -0.09
Ireland 0.61 0.10 -0.04 0.55 Ireland -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 Ireland 0.64 0.15 0.01 0.48
Denmark -0.25 -0.11 -0.16 0.01 Denmark -0.27 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 Denmark 0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.14
Sweden -0.33 -0.18 -0.01 -0.14 Sweden -0.20 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 Sweden -0.13 -0.08 0.02 -0.08
Norway -0.05 -0.01 -0.14 0.09 Norway -0.19 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 Norway 0.13 0.05 -0.07 0.16
Finland 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 Finland -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.06 Finland 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.09
Table 4.5. Convergence Decomposition with Country
Specific Capital Shares, 1960-1975
Table 4.6. Convergence Decomposition with Country
Specific Capital Shares, 1975-2000
Table 4.1. Convergence Decomposition 1960-2000 Table 4.2. Convergence Decomposition 1960-1975 Table 4.3. Convergence Decomposition 1975-2000
Table 4.4. Convergence Decomposition with Country
Specific Capital Shares, 1960-2000
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Within Industry Labor Reallocation Between Industry








Austria 0.18574 0.19021 -0.01690 0.01243
Belgium 0.03656 0.07528 -0.01508 -0.02364
Denmark -0.29550 -0.29159 0.00174 -0.00566
Finland 0.08694 -0.01294 0.07648 0.02339
Germany -0.18532 -0.17639 0.01365 -0.02259
Greece 0.15108 -0.14367 0.22265 0.07211
Ireland
a 0.66513 0.64484 0.00509 0.01519
Italy 0.17588 -0.01138 0.17731 0.00994
Netherlands -0.37501 -0.23461 -0.12447 -0.01593
Norway -0.05943 0.06120 -0.12580 0.00517
Portugal 0.22085 0.04858 0.13063 0.04164
Spain 0.22670 0.05847 0.14043 0.02780
Sweden -0.35827 -0.36782 0.02396 -0.01440
United Kingdom -0.24639 -0.09833 -0.11848 -0.02958








Austria 100.00% 102.41% -9.10% 6.69%
Belgium 100.00% 205.91% -41.24% -64.67%
Denmark 100.00% 98.68% -0.59% 1.91%
Finland 100.00% -14.88% 87.98% 26.90%
Germany 100.00% 95.18% -7.37% 12.19%
Greece 100.00% -95.09% 147.37% 47.73%
Ireland
a 100.00% 96.95% 0.77% 2.28%
Italy 100.00% -6.47% 100.81% 5.65%
Netherlands 100.00% 62.56% 33.19% 4.25%
Norway 100.00% -102.98% 211.68% -8.70%
Portugal 100.00% 22.00% 59.15% 18.85%
Spain 100.00% 25.79% 61.95% 12.26%
Sweden 100.00% 102.67% -6.69% 4.02%
United Kingdom 100.00% 39.91% 48.09% 12.00%
a The values for Ireland correspond to 1970-2000.
Table 5.1. Convergence Decomposition 1960-2000
 
 
51Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austria
a 0.19021 0.17845 0.01176
Belgium 0.07528 -0.01176 0.08704
Denmark -0.29159 -0.33765 0.04606
Finland -0.01294 -0.11098 0.09804
Germany -0.17639 -0.06089 -0.11550
Greece
a -0.14367 0.06531 -0.20898
Ireland
b 0.64484 0.03368 0.61117
Italy -0.01138 -0.04220 0.03083
Netherlands -0.23461 -0.15446 -0.08015
Norway 0.06120 -0.20269 0.26389
Portugal 0.04858 0.00786 0.04071
Spain 0.05847 0.20573 -0.14727
Sweden -0.36782 -0.26671 -0.10111
United Kingdom -0.09833 -0.24155 0.14322
Panel B. Contribution of each subperiod to Within-Industry Convergence
Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austria
a 100.00% 93.82% 6.18%
Belgium 100.00% -15.62% 115.62%
Denmark 100.00% 115.80% -15.80%
Finland 100.00% 857.81% -757.81%
Germany 100.00% 34.52% 65.48%
Greece
a 100.00% -45.46% 145.46%
Ireland
b 100.00% 5.22% 94.78%
Italy 100.00% 370.99% -270.99%
Netherlands 100.00% 65.84% 34.16%
Norway 100.00% -331.18% 431.18%
Portugal 100.00% 16.19% 83.81%
Spain 100.00% 351.88% -251.88%
Sweden 100.00% 72.51% 27.49%
United Kingdom 100.00% 245.66% -145.66%
Table 5.2. Within-Industry Convergence. 1960-1975 and 1975-2000.
Panel A. Within-Industry Convergence, by sub-period
a Values for Austria and Greece correspond to the subperiods 1960-1980 and 
1980-2000. 
b Values for Ireland correspond to the subperiods 1970-1975 and 
1975-2000.
 
52Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austria
a -0.01690 -0.04635 0.0294519
Belgium -0.01508 -0.01534 0.00026
Denmark 0.00174 -0.01001 0.01175
Finland 0.07648 0.06019 0.01629
Germany 0.01365 0.00791 0.00574
Greece
a 0.22265 0.14552 0.07713
Ireland
b 0.00509 0.00882 -0.00373
Italy 0.17731 0.08253 0.09478
Netherlands -0.12447 -0.07747 -0.04700
Norway -0.12580 -0.02582 -0.09999
Portugal 0.13063 0.06996 0.06067
Spain 0.14043 0.07103 0.06941
Sweden 0.02396 0.01126 0.01269
United Kingdom -0.11848 -0.06430 -0.05418
Panel B. Contribution of each subperiod to Labor Reallocation
Country 1960-2000 1960-1975 1975-2000
Austria
a 100.00% 101.71% -1.71%
Belgium 100.00% 101.71% -1.71%
Denmark 100.00% -573.88% 673.87%
Finland 100.00% 78.70% 21.30%
Germany 100.00% 57.93% 42.07%
Greece
a 100.00% 65.36% 34.64%
Ireland
b 100.00% 173.15% -73.14%
Italy 100.00% 46.55% 53.45%
Netherlands 100.00% 62.24% 37.76%
Norway 100.00% 20.52% 79.48%
Portugal 100.00% 53.55% 46.45%
Spain 100.00% 50.58% 49.42%
Sweden 100.00% 47.01% 52.99%
United Kingdom 100.00% 54.27% 45.73%
Table 5.3. Labor Realllocation. 1960-1975 and 1975-2000
Panel A. Labor Reallocation Convergence, by sub-period
a Values for Austria and Greece correspond to the subperiods 1960-1980 and 
1980-2000. 
b Values for Ireland correspond to the subperiods 1970-1975 and 
1975-2000.
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54                    Figure 6.2: Capital Intensity and TFP Relative to France
Capital per Worker Relative to France
Easterners: 2000, Southerners: 1960
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55Table 6.1. The Southerners in 1960 and the Easterners in 2000
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Agriculture Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services
Spain 1960 0.207 -0.046 -0.144 0.854 0.597 1.036 2.099 2.863
Italy 1960 0.113 -0.017 -0.089 0.940 0.715 1.321 2.283 3.315
Austria 1960 0.017 0.028 -0.060 0.948 0.812 0.803 2.572 1.998
Greece 1960 0.344 -0.144 -0.155 0.565 0.529 1.130 2.815 4.719
Portugal 1960 0.268 -0.091 -0.135 0.571 0.567 0.690 2.977 2.848
Malta 2000 -0.025 0.105 -0.022 1.983 0.829 1.016 0.750 0.779
Estonia 2000 0.028 0.112 -0.091 0.472 0.252 0.400 0.959 1.287
Czech Republic 2000 0.013 0.152 -0.240 0.599 0.392 0.559 1.174 1.420
Cyprus 2000 0.012 -0.015 0.031 0.852 0.644 0.869 1.356 1.551
Hungary 2000 0.024 0.092 -0.160 0.521 0.435 0.556 1.499 1.621
Slovak Republic 2000 0.050 0.098 -0.216 0.379 0.384 0.549 1.821 2.203
Bulgaria 2000 0.225 0.075 -0.213 0.194 0.208 0.320 1.926 2.510
Latvia 2000 0.102 0.052 -0.087 0.150 0.219 0.344 2.628 3.494
Slovenia 2000 0.054 0.167 -0.147 0.359 0.562 0.769 2.810 3.257
Lithuania 2000 0.142 0.059 -0.132 0.184 0.294 0.322 2.868 2.663
Turkey 2000 0.303 0.026 -0.265 0.189 0.331 0.453 3.150 3.647
Romania 2000 0.410 0.065 -0.384 0.072 0.190 0.327 4.728 6.899
Poland 2000 0.220 0.042 -0.263 0.087 0.404 0.568 8.368 9.973
Sectoral Productivity                
Relative to France
Sectoral Productivity Relative 
to Agricultural Productivity
Country Year
Difference in Employment Shares 
Relative to France
 















































































































































































































































































57Table 6.2. Sectoral Sources of Income Gaps
Country Year Total Gap Within Between Covariance
Italy 1960 0.08 0.00 0.12 -0.04
Austria 1960 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.00
Spain 1960 0.49 0.28 0.19 0.02
Greece 1960 0.77 0.33 0.42 0.02
Portugal 1960 1.03 0.65 0.26 0.12
Malta 2000 0.06 0.09 0.02 -0.05
Cyprus 2000 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.01
Slovenia 2000 0.48 0.51 0.07 -0.10
Hunagary 2000 0.93 0.98 0.01 -0.06
Czech Rep. 2000 1.02 1.08 0.04 -0.10
Slovakia 2000 1.08 1.09 0.06 -0.06
Poland 2000 1.43 1.30 0.27 -0.14
Estonia 2000 1.85 1.88 0.04 -0.07
Turkey 2000 2.23 1.91 0.32 0.00
Latvia 2000 2.51 2.42 0.10 -0.01
Lithuania 2000 2.52 2.39 0.09 0.03
Bulgaria 2000 3.13 2.89 0.19 0.05
Romania 2000 4.79 4.09 0.68 0.03
58                     Figure A.1: Two Measures of Years of  Schooling
Greece
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